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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
According to the US Government, over 60 percent of the
cocaine intended for the US market transit through Central
American. Since the early 1990‘s, Colombian and Mexican
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) established logistics
bases both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central
America, facilitating the movements of large shipments of
cocaine. In establishing these routes, the DTOs took
advantage of a number of local enabling factors. Among
them, the preexistence of well-established smuggling
networks, the weakness of law enforcement and judicial
structures in most countries in the region, and the overall
culture of lawless and impunity resulting from the civil
conflicts that marked the paths to democracy of some of
these nations. The tough campaigns launched against DTOs
by the governments of Colombia and Mexico during the past
eight years, coupled with the gradual evolution of both local
and foreign criminal organizations (COs) involved in (but
not exclusively) cocaine trafficking, seem to have further
worsened the situation in Central America.
Old styled DTOs and local ―transportistas‖1 are
increasingly challenged by new criminal groups, usually
emerging from the military and claiming specific territories.
These new groups are exerting a capillary control over all
types of criminal activity taking place in the territories under
their control. The confrontation between two different
criminal ―cultures‖-- the first, business oriented; the second
one, territorial oriented-- constitutes a serious threat not only
to the security of citizens, but also to the very consolidation
of balanced democratic rule in the region.

1

Transportistas are the truck, freight and all ground transportation
personnel and routes that have traditionally moved goods and services
throughout Central America and beyond. Transportistas have been also
traditionally associated with contraband and more recently with
smuggling of narcotics.

Mexican DTOs and COs poses a serious threat to Central
American, if left unchecked. Responses by national
institutions, assisted by their main international partners, will
have to be carefully tailored according to the specific feature
of the predominant foreign criminal organization operating
in its territory. In the case of DTOs, interventions will have
to privilege investments in the areas of financial
investigations, specialized prosecution and international
cooperation, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. In
combating COs (Zetas type), intervention will have to
privilege restructuring, professionalization and deployment
of local police corps that would then be capable of
controlling the territory and preventing the infiltration of
external criminal actors. In both cases, governments need to
strengthen the intelligence capacity of law enforcement
agencies allowing the early identification of the likely threat,
its analysis and its subsequent removal. National law
enforcement and judicial efforts should also be geared
toward the creation of a sincere and mutual beneficial
international cooperation (both investigative and judicial)
that is built not only on common objectives, but also on the
use of common investigative instruments and harmonized
procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
2011 will be remembered in Central America as the year of
security. National and international agendas call for
institutional responses to security issues (and criminal
justice) at national and regional levels. Citizens are
particularly concerned with their own security and with
transnational organized crime. National ballots and
governments‘ programs in Costa Rica, Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, and Panama have all included the issue
of security among their top priorities. Similarly, the concept
of regional strategic security has been re-shaped and relaunched at regional Presidential Summits of the Central
American Integration System (Sistema de Integración
Centroamericana--SICA).The impact of crime on Central
America‘s sustainable and balanced development constituted
an integral part of the 2011 World Bank Development
Report. Also, the 41th General Assembly of the Organization
American States (OAS) held in San Salvador, El Salvador,
was devoted to the issue of citizen security. In addition, the
presidents of every country in the region almost weekly sign
bilateral declarations with their main partners (including
Mexico, Colombia, the US) supporting and launching
ongoing and new security related initiatives.
This awakening is certainly welcomed. Along with the
results of the many initiatives in force, it will certainly be of
benefit to the whole region and to each country that follows
political declarations with consequent reforms and budgetary
allocations. Never as today has the region‘s policy decisionmakers understood the need for granting State policy status
to security and justice concerns.
The threat posed by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs)
and criminal organizations (COs) to Central American states
and societies is, however, nothing more than the announced
3

evolution of preexisting (and to a certain extent unattended)
phenomena: the growing importance of the region in the
flow of drugs (mainly cocaine) toward the North American
markets; and the evolution of local and foreign criminal
operators who have made certain Central American
territories their potential strongholds. In this respect, if the
flow of money generated by drug (trafficking and
production) continue to be a source of threat-- at least for the
next ten years--then, the most serious challenge to Central
American Governments and their international partners will
come from emerging new criminal actors whose structure
and modus operandi challenge directly the fundamental
prerogatives of the State. Hence, the need for ―denarcotizing‖ the national and international agenda and
expanding the response of States institutions to the
development of a culture of security and justice build on
citizenship, democratic values and the due respect for rule of
law.
CAUGHT IN THE CROSS FIRE
The 2007 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) Report, ―Crime and Development in Central
America: Caught in the Crossfire,‖ listed geography,
underdevelopment, low criminal justice capacity, and a
history of conflict as the main vulnerability factors for the
development and rooting of DTOs.2 Since the publishing of
this first analysis, a few additional factors have further
contributed to the escalation of the threat. For example, in
Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe‘s anti-narcotic and antiguerrilla policies succeeded in regaining territories under
State control and reducing both coca bush cultivation and
room for illegality, including drug trafficking. Colombian
2

United Nations, Office of Drugs and Crime, Crime and Development in
Central America: Caught in the Crossfire, UN Publication ISBN 978-921-030038-4, May 2007.
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DTOs and guerrilla units involved in drug trafficking
(including demobilized paramilitary groups) have
subsequently shifted their trafficking bases and routes to
neighboring countries. Large seizures and reports of
operations against cocaine trafficking in Venezuela,
Ecuador, Panama, and to a lesser extent Costa Rica, are
indicators of this development.
Almost simultaneously, the violence resulting from the fight
for control of land routes to the U.S. and the penetration of
national and particularly, local and municipal institutions by
the DTOs‘ power to corrupt left the Mexican Executive with
no alternative but to also confront narcotrafficking squarely.
It did so by mobilizing existing security resources (the Army
and the Navy) and initiating radical reforms of security and
justice institutions. As happened in Colombia, institutional
progress in Mexico and successful tactical operations have
accelerated the re-localization of Mexican DTOs (and their
new and much more dangerous competitors, the Zeta) to
neighboring countries, particularly Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador and Belize.
The use of Central American countries as transshipment
location for cocaine trafficking is not a new feature of the
cocaine business. In the 1980s, Colombian cartels had
already established logistics bases in Panama and Honduras.
In the 1990s, the dismantling of major Colombian cartels and
the rising importance of Mexican DTOs in shipping cocaine
to the US via Mexican land routes, turned Central American
locations in meeting points between Colombian providers
and Mexican buyers. The peace processes of the l980s and
the restructuring of State security institutions that followed
in El Salvador and Guatemala facilitated both the
development of national drug trafficking operators and the
consolidation of the foreign DTOs presence.
5

Cocaine shipments are transferred to Central American
locations both by air and by sea. In the 1980s, Juan Ramón
Matta Ballesteros from Honduras had established the first air
bridges between the Colombian, Central American
transportistas and Mexican partners. In the late 1990s and
following the Mexican DTOs rising power, air corridors
from both Colombia and Central American locations
extended up to southern Mexico. Today, the air corridors to
the Caribbean and Central America, particularly in the
Caribbean provinces of Honduras and Nicaragua, as well as
those of Guatemala, and more recently Belize, continue to be
of fundamental importance for DTOs. According to the AntiNarcotic Division of the National Civilian Police of El
Salvador, 20 percent of all cocaine shipments transiting
Central America are moved by air. From January to June
2010, air traffic control authorities reported 79 suspicious
events, of which 56were directed to and originating from
Central American locations. In 2009, the number of reported
suspicious air tracks totaled 192 events, of which 87
involved Central American locations. In 2008, the events
totaled 189; in 2007, there were 214.3

3

Presentation delivered by the Investigative Subdivision, Anti Narcotic
Division, of the National Police of El Salvador, San Salvador, El
Salvador, 09 November, 2010.
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Suspicious air events 2009

Source: Investigative subdivision, Anti Narcotic Division, National
Civilian Police, El Salvador, 09, Nov, 2010.

Again, according to the Anti-Narcotic Division of the
National Civilian Police of El Salvador, maritime trafficking
accounted for 80 percent of the cocaine flown via Central
American countries in 2009. Shipments of several tons of
cocaine are moved by ―fast speed‖ boats, fishing vessels, and
freighters on both the Pacific and the Caribbean coasts. The
use of self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels able
to move shipments up to 7-10 tons has been recently
reported on the Caribbean coast of Honduras, after its first
appearance on the Pacific coasts a few years ago. In 2009,
maritime authorities reported about 1141 suspicious
maritime events of which, 552 were on the Pacific and 489
in the Caribbean.4

4

Ibid.
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Suspicious Maritime Events 2009

Source: Investigative subdivision, Anti Narcotic Division, National
Civilian Police, El Salvador, 09 Nov. 2010.

Data on maritime and air trafficking mirror data on cocaine
seizures reported by law enforcement agencies in the region
and confirm the growing importance of Central America in
the cocaine trafficking business.
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Seizure of Cocaine Shipments --Central America and
Mexico 2006- 2010
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According to the 2011 US State Department, International
Narcotics Control Report Strategy (INCRS), over 60 percent
of the cocaine trafficked to the US today is smuggled
through Central America.5 In 2010, all Central American
countries, except El Salvador, reported cocaine seizures
above 1 ton. Cumulative regional cocaine seizure from 2006
to 2010 accounted for 461.5 tons, with an annual average of
92.3 tons and a maximum peak of 110.7 tons in 2007. If the
average interception rate of the region stands at 53–58
5

International Narcotics Control Report Strategy 2011, Vol. 1 page 270,
US Dept. of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs.

9

percent,6 then some 195 tons of cocaine may be shipped
every year through Central America toward the US markets.
Contrary to expectations, the quite sharp decline of cocaine
seizure reported by Mexico in 2010 was not mirrored by any
important increase in any of its neighboring countries (but
Belize). This element coupled with a progressive but
continued decline of cocaine consumption in the US may be
interpreted as a tendency towards the stabilization of the
regional cocaine flow.
OPERATORS:
LOCALS

FOREIGNERS

AND

INCREASINGLY

Drug trafficking is a quite complex and risky venture. As in
licit trade, the added value of the item trafficked mirrors the
complexity of its transport and the distance to travel from
place of origin to destination. In the transnational criminal
business it means that each frontier crossing adds complexity
and value to the trafficked item. Hence, international drug
trafficking provides for a chain of operators all along the
trafficking route, each of them responsible for safely moving
the illicit shipment from one point (frontier) to another. The
longer the trip, the more rings added to the chain. Just as
other traders do, drug trafficking entrepreneurs seek to
reduce the risks involved. These risks can be identified as
those related to law enforcement operations (seizure and
judicial prosecution); losing of the merchandise/shipment
accidentally or as a result of a betrayal (stealing by either a
partner/associate/subcontractor or by a competing operators).

6

Based on data of seizure and potential production, UNODC reckons the
global cocaine interception rate between 46 and 60 percent of total
production. The multi ton nature of the Central American shipments
suggests the regional interception rate could be tentatively estimated
somewhere in between the low and top UNODC estimate. See, UNODC
World Drug Report 2011; pg. 107.
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In the early days of cocaine trafficking, Colombian DTOs
known as ―cartels‖ co-owned trafficking routes. Risks were
reduced through a combination of a quasi monopoly in the
supply of the smuggled good and a common negotiating
stance vis-á-vis the different rings of the trafficking chain.
These two factors allowed the safe travel of joint shipments.
Local partners involved in the transit of a shipment were
rewarded on the basis of established tariffs and were
responsible for ensuring both the logistics and the protection
needed for the safe running of the operation. In the process,
local service providers, both Mexican or Central American
transportistas, profited from their knowledge and control of
existing smuggling routes and the networks used to protect
contraband, trafficking of arms and stolen goods. The falling
of the Colombian cartels and the rising of the Mexican DTOs
changed this simple, but effective mechanism.
Capitalizing on the old drug trafficking know-how gained
from the trafficking of opiates and cannabis to the US, as
well as on the accrued financial power resulting from the
involvement in the cocaine business, Mexican DTOs
upgraded their status into the cocaine trafficking business.
First, they became associates; then partners and finally, they
became independent operators.7 By the end of 1990s the
presence of Mexican DTOs in Central American countries
was probably already well established, even if no important
7

The difference between ―associate‖ and ―partner‖ can be made on the
basis of the share of the in- kind payment (drug) negotiated by DTOs
with the owner of the shipment. The higher the share of in-kind payment,
the higher the exposure to the risk involved with the operation.
―Independent operators‖ are DTOs which have guaranteed their supply
directly from source and own the trafficking chain (route) which allows
the transfer of shipment to wholesale distributors at final markets. In this
respect it can be assumed that major Mexican DTOs like the Sinaloa and
the Gulf cartels, operate as independent operators, buying raw material
(cocaine HCL and more recently, cocaine base) directly from the
Colombian DTOs suppliers or associates.
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arrests and law enforcement operations can support this
claim.8 This lack of evidence may be justified by the low,
business oriented profile of Mexican DTOs and operators in
transit countries and by the overall distribution of risk and
responsibilities along the trafficking chains. Similarly, no
major operations and arrests of either local or international
drug trafficking entrepreneurs were undertaken by national
Central American law enforcement and investigative
institutions.
As mentioned earlier, Mexican and Colombian DTOs
operating in Central American relied on the logistic and
protection services provided by local transportistas. In a
recent working paper, Steve S. Dudley provides a wellconstructed analysis of the role, development and respective
geographical areas of operation of the transportistas in
Guatemala and in Honduras.9 Dudley‘s analysis is further
complemented by a recent investigative report on the socalled ―Texis Cartel,‖ published by the electronic newspaper
El Faro in El Salvador.10 Both reports highlight the nature of
service provided by local transportistas, and their
willingness to offer their services to whoever requests them.
The role of local criminal networks in Costa Rica, Belize,
Nicaragua and Panama is less clear. The geographical
8

Joaquin Guzman Loera aka ―El Chapo Guzman‖, the leader of the
Sinaloa DTOs was arrested somewhere nearby the border between
Mexico and Guatemala in 1993 ―The Drug Lord Who Got Away,‖ Wall
Street Journal, June 13, 2009.
9
Steven S. Dudley, ―Drug Trafficking Organizations in Central
America: Transportistas, Mexican Cartels and Maras Working Paper
Series on U.S.-Mexico Security Collaboration,‖ Woodrow Wilson Center
and the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego, May
2010.
10
Sergio Arauz, Oscar Martínez, Efrén Lemus, ―El Cartel de los Texis,‖
El Faro (El Salvador) 16 May 2011,
http://www.elfaro.net/es/201105/noticias/4079/?st-full_text=4.
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position of Panama and Costa Rica may justify the
assumption of a more active participation of Colombian
DTOs in the preparation and running of transshipment
operations, and a residual participation and role of local
operators as manpower for logistic tasks. The recent increase
in homicide rates reported in these two countries, apparently
linked to drug trafficking, may be a first signal of a changing
scenario. In Nicaragua, the successful restructuring of
civilian and military law enforcement structures reduced
opportunities for the development of local trafficking
networks, as corroborated by the maritime nature of the
majority of Nicaraguan large cocaine seizures. But, the
situation in Nicaragua may also be evolving. Seizure of
chemical precursors and the discovery of a large
methamphetamine laboratory in Nicaraguan territory, along
with the quite impressive record in seized air, sea and land
vehicles,11 are all indicators of the increasing importance of
the country for the cocaine trafficking route and of the likely
development of the logistic networks enabling the passage of
large and convoluted cocaine shipments. On the other hand,
however, the impressive records in seizure and operations
indicate the overall capacity of Nicaraguan law enforcement
authorities in facing the phenomenon.
The situation in Belize might be similar. The steady increase
in cocaine and methamphetamine precursor seizures, the
recent arrest of a US-wanted Guatemalan drug trafficker12
and the increase in the local homicide rate (probably linked
to increased drug trafficking) signal a worsening situation.
Contrary to Nicaragua, however, Belizean authorities do not
11

INCSR 2011, Vol.1 page 422.
In November 2010 a Belizean US DEA joint operation resulted in the
seizure of 2.6 tons of cocaine, one aircraft and one go fast vessel in
November 2010. Also in 2010 Belizean authorities seized 40 tons of
phenyl-acetic acid (PAA) a chemical precursor used in the manufacturing
of methamphetamine, as well as 122,000 units of pseudoephedrine.
INCSR 2011 , Vol.1 page 137.
12
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seem to have the structural capacity to face the growing
threat. With unpatrolled borders with both Mexico and
Guatemala, a strategic position in the Caribbean Gulf, and its
dual Caribbean and Central American cultures make Belize a
natural target for transshipment of cocaine and chemical
precursors, and a safe haven for hiding and laundering
criminal derived proceeds.
THE MEXICAN DTOS (AND COS) THREAT
While Mexican DTOs have been present in Central
American together with Colombian providers and trafficking
operators, but they were not considered a major threat to
regional stability. The recent changes in their modus
operandi, their infiltration into local and central institutions,
and the violence which is accompanying this dynamic have
however changed the dimension of the threat they pose to
Central American governments and societies. Invoking the
principle of shared responsibilities in the fight against drug
trafficking, Central American Heads of State have all boldly
denounced the threat, and called upon the US, Colombia and
Mexico to assume their responsibilities as major consumers,
producers and transit countries. Indeed, as result of crackdown against carried out in Colombia and Mexico, with the
support of the US, Mexican and Colombian DTOs and COs
have relocated their operations in the Central American
region, producing the so-called ―cockroach effect.‖13 In
13

Bruce Bagley, for example, argues that, the ―cockroach‖ effect refers
specifically to the displacement of criminal networks from one
city/state/region to another within a given country or from one country to
another in search of safer havens and more pliable state
authorities.‖Bruce Bagley, ―Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in
the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty First Century, ―Agrarian
Ideas for a Developing World, (March 24, 2011), Reprinted from article
published in Spanish by Razón Pública in November 2010,
http://agrarianideas.blogspot.com/2011/03/essay-on-drug-trends-bybruce-bagley.html.
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essence, squeezed in their countries of origin, DTOs, and
COs are ―colonizing‖ new territories.
The situation in some Central America countries is alarming
indeed. In Guatemala and in Honduras, head of states have
denounced receiving dead threats by DTOs and COs. Both
countries, as well as El Salvador, have mobilized their
Armies and sent them out to patrol and police part of the
country in response to the growing crime situation and
increased murder rates linked to drug trafficking. There are
reports of the presence of the Sinaloa cartel (DTOs) and of
the Zetas (COs), and to a lesser extent, of the Gulf cartel
(DTOs) and the Familia Michoacana (COs) in the region.14
According to these reports, the Sinaloa Cartel led by Joaquin
Guzman Loera aka ―El Chapo Guzman‖ would be wellestablished on the Pacific side of Guatemala, Honduras and
El Salvador, with agents operational also in Nicaragua, Costa
Rica and Panama. The Zetas, on the other hand, appear to be
focusing their expansion on the Caribbean coast, with their
main stronghold in Guatemala and an increased presence in
Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
The pattern of geographical expansion of these two main
Mexican criminal groups mirrors to a large extent their
localization within the Mexican territory and their
progressive cannibalization of other criminal groups
operating in their territories. The expansion of the Sinaloa
cartel confirms it‘s predominantly DTO nature and suggests
it is trying to ensure its future by developing and controlling
14

See, ―Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana y el cartel del Golfo teen
presencia en Costa Rica, “La Jornada, 24 August 2011
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/08/24/politica/015n1pol; and
―¿Cómo se reparten Centroamérica los cárteles mexicanos?” Animal
Politico, April 7, 2011,
http://www.animalpolitico.com/2011/04/%C2%BFcomo-se-repartencentroamerica-los-carteles-mexicanos/.
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new cocaine (and increasingly methamphetamine) supply
routes to North American and emerging markets. Its control
of trafficking routes goes hand in hand with the development
of production/refining facilities, increased opium poppy
cultivation on the Pacific side of Guatemala‘s San Marco
province, the discovery of a big cocaine refining laboratory
in Honduras and the increased seizures of methamphetamine
chemical precursors in Guatemala, El Salvador and
Honduras.
Instead, the Zetas‘ concentration on the
Caribbean coast reflects more the concurrence of some
external factor rather than the result of a designed strategic
plan.
The Zetas are not specialized in drug trafficking, like the
Sinaloa Cartel. Their objective is, indeed, to provide
protection on activities run by criminal and licit economic
operators in territories under their control. Also, the Zetas‘
localization is often the result of the relative easiness their
scouts find in penetrating new territories and setting up a
presence (cells). In this current bipolar scenario, the presence
and operations of other Mexican criminal groups in Central
America looks more like residual and complementary. The
future of the these smaller Mexican criminal groups in the
regions will probably depend on the outcomes of both, the
fight the Sinaloa Cartel and the Zetas are staging in Mexico
(and in some particular Central American locations like
Guatemala, Honduras), as well as the result of the vigorous
prosecution against them carried out in Mexico.
In the short/mid-term, it could be expected that smaller
Mexican DTOs and COs will side with bigger ones in drug
trafficking as a business-focused tactical alliances. The
natural law of evolution will then determine their fates.
There are several possible scenarios. In a first one, small
DTOs will be swallowed by the bigger DTOs. In this case,
tactical alliances will favor the Sinaloa Cartel because of its
16

business orientation versus the military/territorial culture of
the Zetas. A second possible scenario could envisage small
DTOs inheriting the trafficking routes and the control of
drug flow as a consequence of the mutual weakening of the
cartel of Sinaloa and the Zetas, and the successful
prosecution against them. This scenario would be similar to
what happened to DTOs in Colombia immediately after the
dismantling of the Bogotá, Medellin and Cali cartels. A third
scenario sees the Sinaloa cartel and the Zetas reaching a
peace settlement and agreeing on each other respective
geographical area of domain (pax mafiosa). The price of the
peace would be paid by smaller DTOs and COs which would
be either absorbed or eliminated. This scenario is, however,
the least likely because of the radical difference in the nature
of the two criminal organizations. Indeed, if the Sinaloa
cartel has all the features of a traditional criminal
organization, in the sense of aiming to ―control the
production, supply and distribution of a given commodity or
service unlawfully,‖ then the Zetas are much closer to a
typical Mafia organization, whose aim is ―controlling the
supply of protection‖15 in the territory where they are
established. In other words a peace agreement among the
two groups is highly unlike.
NEW AND OLD CRIMINAL “CULTURES”
There are fundamental difference in the nature and scope of
the two major criminal operators in the Mexican and Central
American scenario. These factors, as well as an
understanding of their organizational structures, potential
source of revenues, and recruitment mechanisms, provide
important elements for both interpreting the steady increase
in violence in the region, and also, for tailoring (read also reorienting) crime control policies and strategies.
15

Federico Varese, Critical Concepts in Criminology (London, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
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The Sinaloa cartel derives all its revenues from drug
production and trafficking. In contrast, the Zetas do not
seem to be specialized in any particular criminal venture but
rather in using intimidation and violence for imposing their
dominance. Hence, the Zetas‘ activities focus on making
sure any criminal operator active in their area pay them a
share of their profits (derecho de piso). Failure to abide by
their rules is punished with violence. In this context, if the
Sinaloa Cartel aims at controlling drug trafficking routes, the
Zetas aims at controlling the territory where trafficking
routes passes on.16 The shift in the nature of the core
business of the Zetas, from an illicit trafficker in
product/services (drugs, arms, people, etc.) to the provision
of ―protection,‖ results in a reduced exposure to the
economic risks linked to the specific criminal venture
(seizures). It also allows the criminal group to expand their
protection to any other commercial and productive activity
taking place in the territory under their control, thus
diversifying their potential sources of income.
Differences in the core business also imply significant
consequences in term of structures and recruitment
modalities. This may prove to be of fundamental importance
in the Central American context because of the co-existence
of Mexican criminal operators with local COs. Pyramidal
shaped structure is the standard for DTOs. Under this
structure, risk reduction and profit maximization is in the
hands of just a few.
16

This different business orientation was also a feature of the Gulf Cartel
of which the Zetas were originally the fire arm. According to an
anonymous source cited by Grupo Savant, the war which erupted in
2005 between the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartel was caused by the decision of
El Chapo Guzman ― to fight to death‖ to recover the northeastern
Mexican corridor where the Gulf Cartel was charging him a fee for
moving drug shipments. In Grupo Savant, ―The perfect storm is brewing
in northeastern Mexico: A predictive analysis,‖ November 21, 2010;
page 3.
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Cartel de Sinaloa- Standard Hierarchy

Source: Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal
Groups in Sixteen Countries, UNODC September 2002, page 34.

In DTOs typical structures, only those at the top of the
pyramidal structure know who does what along the
trafficking chain. Control of the trafficking route is the result
of the ability at the top (drug kingpin, transportista) in
managing the different ring of the chain. Recourse to
violence is generally left for betrayal and stealing. The value
of the item trafficked and the risk of seizure suggest that
DTOs operators prefer a low profile and favor corruption as
the instrument used for ensuring the smooth running of the
business. Thus, the best trafficking route is the least
noticeable. The segmented, secretive structure of DTOs also
implies limited access to its internal organization. Manpower
recruitment is handed at the level of each one of the rings of
the trafficking chain, and is always dependent on the specific
task that the ring will perform. Logistics tasks are mostly
carried out by personnel that are not part of DTO‘s structure,
but often are corrupted officials who ignore the true nature of
the venture.

19

In contrast, not much is known about the structure of Zeta
type COs. Their (para) military origin, the lack of
specialization in any particular criminal business, a few
media reports17 and anecdotes on their expansion in Mexico
and the region, seem to suggest the following tentative
analysis of their structure. Apparently the Zeta operates
through a kind of ―feudal‖ system model. It expands by
progressively adding independent and self-sustained cells
that are established for occupying new territories. EMPRA, a
Mexico-based political risk advisory group, states that the
Zetas structure,
…is both rigidly hierarchical (original
members were known as Z-1, Z-3, etc.
according to their rank in the organization)
while at the same time significantly
decentralized. Regional bosses are relatively
well-controlled, yet maintain a great deal of
discretion as to how they will meet their
annual financial goals.18
New cells are established by ‗true Zetas‘, meaning;
operatives who are part of the core organization, and who are
tasked with replicating the mother model in new territories.
Scouting missions aimed at evaluating the situation on the
ground and establishing contacts with possible new local
affiliates often precede the opening up of new cells. The
criteria used for the localization of new cells are unknown.
Decisions are probably taken on a combination of factors,
such as weakness of State institutions and of other local
criminal organizations; strategic and economic importance of
17

InSight published an excellent report on the Zetas in Guatemala; see,
Steven Dudley, ―The Zetas in Guatemala,‖ InSight Crime, 8 September
2011.
18
EMPRA, ―The Rise of Los Zetas: A look into Mexico‘s most
dangerous criminal organization; Ramifications for national security,‖ 20
June 2011.
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the territory; and preexisting knowledge and contacts with
local criminal operators. In this respect the Zetas‘ structure
may be classified as an evolution of the ―clustered hierarchy
model‖ in which the previous military experience both in
Mexico and Guatemala, offer a common identity among
members.
Los Zetas – Clustered Hierarchy (evolution of)

Source: Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal
Groups in Sixteen Countries, UNODC September 2002, page 37.

Originally, Zetas‘ recruitment favored former military and
law enforcement personnel19 because of their familiarity with
weapons and violence, and their access to potential network
within local criminal underworld and corruption network.
These features probably continue to characterize the Zetas‘
senior level structure. Lower level recruitment depends more
on criminal operators already present on the territory and to
whom the mother cell offers a kind of franchise on the use of
the Zeta‘s criminal mark. More recently recruitment has been
19

It is well known that several Kaibiles, military staff from a special
forces unit of the Guatemalan Army trained and equipped by the United
States during that country‘s civil war, joined the ranks of the Zetas .
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widely opened as indicated by the very young age and little
criminal experience of Zetas arrested in Mexico. This is also
seen in the more recent tactical alliances of Zetas cells with
juvenile gangs/maras and pandillas in both Mexico and
Central America. There are also allegations of forced
recruitment among kidnapped migrants transiting Mexico.
This apparently contradictory recruitment strategy is justified
in the need for new cells for ensuring territorial control
through a bold physical presence. War and occupation
scenarios call for large pool of fresh manpower (footsoldiers) that can be easily mobilized, or also easily disposed
of. The mother cell provides the new franchisee with
(military) training and probably arms as part of the affiliation
package. Nothing is known about the obligations of new
cells to the mother cell, as well as about the degree of
operational freedom each new cell is endowed with. For
sure, new cells are due to channel a share of their revenues to
their respective mother cell. Similarly, it is most likely new
cells must reach a kind of solidarity pact with their mother
cell and the Zetas core group in case of violent confrontation
with other criminal organizations. Finally, new cells are
responsible for preserving the ―good name― of the Zetas by
chastising with violence (death) the use of the Zetas‘ trade
mark by unauthorized criminal operators.
An analysis of the very different structure of these two
criminal groups, their recruitment processes and needs,
allow for a preliminary identification of their likely
strengths and weaknesses, as well as of the intrinsic risks and
opportunities the two criminal models face in their expansion
throughout the region. The closed and secretive structure of
the Sinaloa Cartel and other DTOs, coupled with their
specialization in drug (trafficking and production) and their
business orientation can be considered one of its strengths
because it offers the capacity for co-opting local partners and
22

generating mutual beneficial alliances. Recourse to violence
is, in this perspective, only used as a last resort and as a
punishment for violation of the rules of the game.
The opposite can be said of the Zetas model. The autonomy
of each cells, the very nature of its core business (territorial
control) and the consequent need for sustaining control and
expansion through unselective recruitment lead necessarily
to the atomization of the original structure and the
progressive separation, and confrontation, among cells. The
Zetas‘ model of expansion also clashes with local criminal
groups that will not accept their dominance. Hence, intra cell
violence, as well as violence between cells and local
criminal-groups becomes the rule until one of the fighting
groups prevails. In this scenario, violence will also target
innocent civilians residing in the territory under dispute. An
exception to this dynamic may be represented by
(temporary) alliances with seasoned Maras‘ groups and local
pandillas, that to certain extent, operate similarly to the Zetas
(territorial control, diversification of criminal activities with
no particular specialization and extensive use of intimidation
and violence). Also in this case, however, alliances are
destined to be broken and violent confrontation may become
the final likely scenario. On the basis of the above, it can be
said that the Zetas‘ model of expansion is its strength in the
short run, but also a weakness in the mid and long terms.
LATEST TRENDS AND NEW THREATS
Recent changes in major drug consumption markets,
particularly the US, may lead Mexican DTOs to restructure
not only their trafficking routes, but also their overall
product portfolio. During the last five years, Central
American countries have reported steady increases in the
seizures of chemical precursors and laboratories used mostly
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in the manufacture of methamphetamines.20 Despite the fact
that methamphetamine production is quite a simple process,
the volume of chemical precursors seized, together with
location of seizures and route of smuggling seems to point at
Mexican DTOs as the most likely owners of these new
business ventures. Both the Sinaloa Cartel and La Familia
Michoacana ―own‖ the know-how of methamphetamine
production and have a well-developed international
distribution network, both in North America and new
emerging markets. Re-localization of methamphetamine
production seems also to be accompanied by an attempt in
increasing control and revenues on cocaine processing, as
well as on production and exporting of local heroin. In
March 2011, Honduran law enforcement authorities
discovered and dismantled a cocaine processing lab with
capacity for processing up to 400 kilos of cocaine paste into
cocaine HCL per week. According to Honduran authorities
the discovered lab was operated by the Sinaloa Cartel.21 In
Guatemala, national authorities eradicated 918 ha of opium
poppy in 2010 and 1345 ha in 2009.22 Tentative estimates
from well informed non-official sources supported by
eradication data range local opium poppy cultivation
between 1500 and 2000 ha.
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UNODC, Amphetamines and Ecstasy 2011 Global ATS Assessment,
September 2011.
21
―Laboratorio hallado en Honduras sería del cartel de Sinaloa, según
ministro,‖ Latino Foxnews, 11 March 2011,
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/03/11/laboratorio-halladoen-honduras-sera-del-cartel-sinaloa-segn-ministro/#ixzz1XYuayWWl.
On the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel in Honduras see also, James
Bosworth, ―Honduras: Organized Crime Gaining Amid Political Crisis,‖
Working Paper Series on Organized Crime in Central America, Latin
American Program Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
December 2010, pages 5 to 7,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Bosworth.FIN.pdf.
22
UNODC WDR 2011, Op cit, page 59.
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Opium poppy fields, San Marcos Province, Guatemala, June 2011

According to local sources the harvested opium gum is sold
to Mexican buyers either in situ or at the nearby Mexico25

Guatemala frontier. Its long tradition in heroin production
and trafficking to the US, coupled with its established
presence in Guatemala, suggest a likely participation of the
Sinaloa Cartel in this area.
The Sinaloa Cartel expansion of the products profile goes
hand in hand with its apparent market expansion. In 2010,
and following a number of seizure, Australian authorities
warned about the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel in the
Australian cocaine market.23 In 2008, Malaysian authorities
dismantled a methamphetamine lab and arrested a group of
Mexican apparently also linked to the Sinaloa Cartel.24 The
Pacific relocation seems also to be confirmed by reports
about the presence of Sinaloa Cartel operational cells in
Ecuador and Peru.25 These reports, along with the
consolidated presence of the Sinaloa cartel in marijuana
production and trafficking, indicate that the Sinaloa Cartel is
attempting to establish itself as the first illicit narcotics
multinational, controlling production and wholesale
distribution of a variety of drugs to different markets. In this
context, the power of the Sinaloa Cartel will be inherent to
its capacity of generating revenues through a continuous reprofiling of both its products and its presence on global
markets, and of reinvesting revenues in the network of
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―El cártel de Sinaloa pone en jaque a las autoridades de Australia,‖
CNN Mexico, 15 September 2010,
http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2010/09/15/el-cartel-de-sinaloa-pone-enjaque-a-las-autoridades-de-australia. See also, Tim Palmer, ―Mexican
Connection‖ Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 15 September 2010,
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s3012966.html.
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corruption which allows the smooth running of production
and trafficking operations.
Another new and quite concerning phenomenon apparently
linked to the growing power of COs (both local and
Mexican) in Central America is land purchases. According to
a recent study on land ownership transfer in the Petén
Department, Guatemala, drug trafficking transportistas are
the ones behind a kind of agrarian reform.26 From 2005 to
2010, 90 percent of land changed hands in the municipality
of Sayaxché. The figures in San José were 75 percent and 69
percent in La Libertad. Other nine municipalities in the Petén
recorded relevant changes in land ownership, ranging from
12 to 35 percent of registered land.
Money laundering and securing logistics bases and landstrips for small planes seems to be the main reason for
purchasing land in the Petén Department. Some lands are
illegally sold since the sellers have occupied the land and
have no legal titles. New buyers trust the State will
legitimize their de facto ownership sooner or later. The
original illegality of land tenure makes sellers particularly
vulnerable to threat and violence by drug traffickers
interested in their lands. According to recent research, the
Zetas do not seem to be directly involved in land purchasing.
Nevertheless, the massacre of 27 workers employed in a
cattle ranch owned by an alleged local drug trafficker in the
La Libertad municipality27 is a clear indicator of the presence
and dominium of the Zetas in these municipalities.28 Less
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Miguel L. Castillo, Land ownership transfer in the Petén, Guatemala,
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Miami, FL. February 2011.
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―Zetas asesinan a 27 jornaleros en Petén,‖ PrensaLibera com , 16 May
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documented but equally dramatic is the alleged involvement
of drug trafficking organizations in Bajo Aguan, an eastern
region of the Colon Department of Honduras, where 14
people were killed in August 2011. According to sources, the
killing was linked to a land dispute among indigenous
communities, cattle and agricultural investors, and drug
traffickers.29 In this regard, the issue of land tenure and the
consequences of the de facto ―agrarian reform‖ pushed ahead
by drug traffickers and paramilitaries in Colombia30 ought to
ring an alarm bell to Central American governments.
CONCLUSIONS
Mexican DTOs and COs poses a serious threat to Central
American, if left unchecked. Responses by national
institutions, assisted by their main international partners, will
have to be carefully tailored according to the specific feature
of the predominant foreign criminal organization operating
in its territory. In the case of DTOs, interventions will have
to privilege investments in the areas of financial
investigations, specialized prosecution and international
cooperation, as well as anti-corruption initiatives. In
combating COs (Zetas type), intervention will have to
privilege restructuring, professionalization and deployment
of local police corps that would then be capable of
controlling the territory and preventing the infiltration of
external criminal actors. In both cases, governments need to
29

―Narcotraficantes en camino de ser latifundistas en Colón, “La
Tribuna 19 June 2011,
http://www.latribuna.hn/2011/06/19/narcotraficantes-en-camino-de-serlatifundistas-en-colon/. See also, Hannah Stone, ―Are Foreign Criminal
Gangs Driving Honduras Land Conflict?‖ Insight Crime, 22 August 2011
, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1446-are-foreigncriminal-gangs-driving-honduras-land-conflict.
30
Land Reform a Threat to Criminal Interests in Colombia,‖ InSight
Crime, 12 January 2011, http://insightcrime.org/insight-latestnews/item/424-land-reform-a-threat-to-criminal-interests-in-colombia.
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strengthen the intelligence capacity of law enforcement
agencies allowing the early identification of the likely threat,
its analysis and its subsequent removal. National law
enforcement and judicial efforts should also be geared
toward the creation of a sincere and mutual beneficial
international cooperation (both investigative and judicial)
that is built not only on common objectives, but also on the
use of common investigative instruments and harmonized
procedures.
It is unlikely that the current level of violence experienced
by some Central American countries will dramatically drop
in the short run. External criminal operators are certainly an
important cause, but not the only one. In fact, a significantly
sharp reduction of violence in areas that today are
characterized by high concentration of DTOs‘ and COs‘
interests and investments, ought to raise the suspicion
whether the achieved peace is not the result of a complete
take-over of the territory by one dominant criminal
organization. As correctly stated by Prof. Bagley,
States determine the form or type of
organized crime that can operate and flourish
within a given national territory.31
Hence, the growth or fall of Mexican DTOs and COs in
Central America will depend on the commitments of Central
American Government to facing and defeating them. At this
time, all signs point at a sincere will on the part of Central
American decision-makers and their international partners, to
moving ahead in accomplishing this indispensable endeavor.
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